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Abstract 
 
The role of behavioural and psychological aspects in compliance behaviour is currently 
one of the greatest areas of tax compliance research, and, although several 
accomplishments have been achieved, there is still countless room for development.  
This dissertation aims to be an empirical contribution for the development of the 
behavioural determinants of tax compliance. For that purpose, we use an economic 
experiment, simulating the process of individual declaration of income, to investigate 
compliance behaviour under the influence of three factors. identifiability, geographical 
distance and social norms.  
One of the main goals of this dissertation was to develop an experiment that allowed the 
analysis of how the identifiability of taxes’ causes (public good receiving the collected taxes) 
would influence the tax compliance behaviour, in other words, we aimed at understand if the 
presentation of a more specific, vivid and salient information about the finality of tax collection 
to the taxpayers, influences their compliance decision.  
This experiment was conducted with 286 Portuguese volunteer participants. The results 
achieved provided support for some of the conclusions of previous studies and theories. 
The levels of compliance verified were, on average, considerably high, result in line 
with the fact, already pointed by several researchers, that effective levels of compliance 
are much higher than what standard economic theory of compliance predicts.  
Another relevant result from this experiment was the significant relation registered 
between income level and compliance behaviour, suggesting that tax compliance 
decreases as income increases, this result is in line with the predictions of Allingham 
and Sandmo’s (1972) model. 
 
Key-words: Behavioral economics, tax evasion, bounded rationality, Identifiable victim 
effect, geographical distance, social norms. 
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Introduction
 
The provision of public infrastructures and services play a crucial role in the 
development and growth of economies. The tax revenue is the way by which 
countries guarantee this provision, and that is the reason why it is so important to 
ensure that tax collection works in the most efficient way (Fuest and Riedel, 2009). 
Between the biggest limitations of tax collection there is one in particular that 
has been raising a lot of concerns among governments all over the world, which is 
tax evasion (Alm et al., 1992). Finding patterns of tax evasion behaviour and ways to 
reduce it, is one of the main goals of governments’ agenda nowadays, in order to 
achieve higher levels of compliance. 
The statistics have justified the concerns related to tax evasion. In 2010, 
estimated tax evasion represented approximately 5.1% of world Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), exceeding 3.1 trillion dollars. Results from Portugal, proved that tax 
evasion is a problem worth of serious concerning from the government and tax 
authorities, representing an average of 2% of GDP in the period 1999-2010. 
(Schneider and Buehn, 2012). 
The economic context of crisis that Portugal has been living in recent years 
can be an additional motive of distress to the national levels of compliance. The tax 
burden in Portugal registered, in 2013, a substantial increase of 8,1% due to the 
political measures of austerity  imposed by the economic and political context, 
reaching to an overall tax burden of 34,9% of GDP. This fact brings greater concerns 
to the national fiscal system, as a higher tax burden can foster tax evasion behaviour. 
This is supported by existent literature that showed that an increasing in tax rates can 
result in higher levels of tax evasion (Veiga, 2013; Alm et al., 1992).   
The role of behavioural and psychological aspects in compliance behaviour is 
currently one of the greatest areas of compliance research, and although several have 
been achieved, both theoretically and empirically, there is still countless room for 
development.    
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This dissertation pretends to be an empirical contribution for that 
development. For that purpose, we use an economic experiment, based on a public 
goods game design, to investigate compliance behaviour in Portugal under the 
influence of three factors: identifiability, geographical distance and social norms.  
We investigate in this work, the presence of the identifiable victim effect 
(IVE) on decision making process of compliance. The goal of this approach, was to 
understand if the display of the information to the taxpayers about identifiable causes 
of tax collection (in our experiment we introduce this variable by specifying a 
hospital receiving the amount of tax revenues), would have a significant influence on 
compliance behaviour relative to non-identifiable causes.  
With the introduction of geographical variance of cities receiving the 
revenues resulting from tax collection, we pretend to understand if a higher 
psychological distance, between taxpayers and the cause of tax collection, which is 
sustained, in this study, by a geographical variance, can influence positively tax 
evasion decisions. 
The analysis of the impact of normative context in tax compliance decision 
making process was also aim of our study. The purpose was to verify if, as expected 
by the existent literature, the norm has a significant influence in taxpayers’ decisions. 
This work intends to be a contribution to the literature of compliance 
behaviour, through an empirical approach based on Portuguese context, which, to our 
knowledge, has not yet been object of such a study. Therefore, we believe that the 
lines of this work can be useful and bring valuable insights that can help tax 
authorities developing efficient actions in order to enhance higher levels of 
compliance and avoid evasion. 
The present work is divided in two main parts. 
Part I presents the literature review about the theories of compliance decision 
making, tax evasion context and concepts and the main theories and determinants of 
tax evasion. Then we present, behavioural economics approach of individual 
decision making process, mentioning the work of Kahneman (1979) in the 
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development of the prospect theory and the dual process mode of  decision making - 
System 1 and System 2 in order to conclude about the influence of those different 
systems in the compliance behaviour. In this same section, we present the 
Identifiable Victim Effect (IVE) with the goal to understand its influence in the 
individual income declaration; some studied causes of this effect were also described 
in more detail, due to their pertinence in the thematic of tax evasion and in our 
experiment – psychological distance and social norms. 
        In Part II we presented the experimental design, beginning with the 
description of the main goals and hypothesis and continuing with the methodology, 
sample and procedures used in the experiment. Still in part II is made the description 
of the results of the study. Finally are presented the conclusions of this research, 
stating as well its limitations and insights for future investigations.  
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Part I - Literature Review 
 
1. Tax compliance and tax evasion 
 
The provision of public infrastructures and services play a crucial role in the 
development and growth of economies. The tax revenue is the way by which 
countries guarantee this provision, and that is the reason why it is so important to 
ensure that the tax collection works in the most efficient way (Fuest and Riedel, 
2009). 
Between the biggest limitations of tax collection there is one in particular that 
have raised a lot of concerns among governments all over the world, which is the tax 
evasion (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998). Finding patterns of tax evasion 
behaviour and ways to reduce it is one of the main goals of governments, in order to 
achieve higher levels of compliance. 
 Tax compliance is of great importance not only to guarantee provision of 
public goods and services, and economic growth, but it is also a crucial factor to 
assure equity and efficiency. The increasing economic globalization of the last 
decades, with free mobilization of capital and assets allowed companies to easily 
relocate to places with more advantaged fiscal conditions. This has created a larger 
international fiscal competition between countries, in order to attract the most 
powerful multinational companies (Needham, 2013; Veiga, 2013).  
On the other side, the competition between companies has also increased 
exponentially, and so, the search for strategies to overcome fiscal obligations is now 
even more crucial between management decisions. All these aspects combined result 
in states losing part of the tax revenue due to tax planning and tax evasion from the 
big companies. Consequently, less informed and most vulnerable taxpayers end up to 
have increased taxation, and by so, the fiscal justice and equity are compromised 
(Veiga, 2013). 
The evident importance and complexity of this theme have justified an 
incremental blossomed of literature pursuing a more complete theory of tax 
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compliance that could better explain taxpayer’s decision-making process and, by so, 
help tax authorities and policy makers to develop more efficient methods to avoid 
evasion and promote compliance (Hashimzade et al., 2013).  
The statistics have justified the concerns related to tax evasion. In 2010, 
estimated tax evasion represented approximately 5.1% of world Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), exceeding 3.1 trillion dollars. In a study conducted by Scnheider and 
Buehn (2012) where they developed a time series analysis of tax evasion in % of 
GDP, the results founded indicated an average size of tax evasion of 3,2% of GDP in 
38 countries of OECD, over the period of 1999-2010. In the same study, results 
achieved for Portugal proved that tax evasion is a significant problem there as well, 
representing an average of 2% of GDP in the period 1999-2010 (Schneider and 
Buehn, 2012). 
 Richard Murphy in one of his works calculated that tax losses in Portugal, in 
2010, were over 12, 3 billion dollars, representing 7, 1 % of GDP (about 23% of total 
tax revenues), equivalent to 63,1 % of the government healthcare spending (Murphy, 
2012). These numbers, although lower than the average of the Europe countries, are 
still a reason for serious concerns from the Portuguese government.  
In this same study, Murphy (2012) concluded that tax evasion costs to the 
States of European Union are about 1 billion euros every year. 
The tax burden in Portugal registered, in 2013, a substantial increase of 8,1%, 
mostly due to the recent political measures of high austerity implied by the economic 
context of crisis, reaching to an overall tax burden of 34,9% of GDP. This fact brings 
greater concerns to the national fiscal system as it can foster tax evasion, according 
to existent literature increasing tax rates can result in higher levels of tax evasion 
(Veiga, 2013). This relation between compliance behaviour and tax rates is supported 
also by Alm et al. (1992), who, using data from laboratory experiments, concluded 
that tax compliance increases with decreasing tax rates. 
One indicator usually used in estimations of tax evasion is the size of the 
shadow economy. The shadow economy is composed by activities which by their 
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illegal character, are hidden from the legal fiscal obligations, and also by activities 
that, although legal, do not report their income to the tax authorities. Several works 
suggested the existence of a positive correlation between tax evasion and the size of 
the shadow economy, and, by so, the importance of measuring the size of shadow 
economy as an indicator of the tax evasion level (e.g., Alm et al., 2004; Schneider 
and Klinglmair, 2004; Schneider and Enste, 2000). The current context of crises in 
the financial system and in the world’s economy creates an additional stimulus to tax 
evasion by fostering shadow economy. 
 In Portugal, available estimates from 2003 to 2012, suggest an average size 
of the shadow economy of 20.04 % of the GDP (Schneider, 2013). Given its role as a 
developer of tax evasion, these numbers show that shadow economy, and 
consequently tax evasion, are a significant problem for public finances in Portugal. 
Primarily, it is important to clarify the terminology and concepts here in 
discussion. According to the theory of rational choice, taxpayers’ goal is to maximize 
their profits, minimizing their fiscal costs. There are different ways to achieve that 
goal. Individuals can follow a legal path, known as tax planning or tax flight. These 
activities consist in choosing, accordingly to the law, the best option in terms of 
taxation, as, for instance, the relocation of businesses to tax havens. On the other 
side, there is tax evasion, which consists in the illegal avoidance of fiscal obligations, 
usually related with voluntary actions, for instance by underreporting income or 
stating higher deduction-rates; finally there is tax avoidance, which refers to the use 
of legal means to reduce the tax burden, by taking advantage of tax-loopholes 
(Kirchler et al., 2003; Kirchler et al., 2007 ).   
In this work we are going to address the problem of tax evasion in particular 
in what concerns to individual compliance decision-making. The tax compliance 
behaviour of businesses, which are also of great relevance to this thematic, is out of 
the scope of this work.  
One of the most known indicators of evasion is the tax gap which can be 
defined as the difference between the effective income taxes that families owe and 
7 
  
what they actually pay voluntarily and in time (Andreoni et al., 1998; Franzoni, 
1999).  
Most of individual evasion’s activities are related with one of these situations: 
taxpayers are not registered in tax system; registered taxpayers do not declare; 
registered taxpayers, involuntarily, do not report their income correctly; taxpayers do 
not report part of their income, voluntarily (Ministry of Finance, 2011).  
Undoubtedly, the type of evasion that rises more concerns is the one related 
with voluntary conduct, since the involuntarily form of tax evasion can be prevented 
by policy makers through the simplification of the procedures required to comply 
(Kirchler, 2007; Ministry of Finance, 2011).  
Tax evasion activities are included in the voluntarily type of evasion, since 
they are usually related with an intentional behaviour from taxpayer. 
The activities related with compliance imply a certain set of knowledge from 
taxpayers, both on fiscal obligations applied and their correct calculation, and on the 
procedures necessary to fulfil those obligations (Lopes and Santos, 2013). Therefore 
it is important to guarantee a simplified fiscal system, in order to promote equity 
between taxpayers, since less informed taxpayers can be overwhelmed by a complex 
tax system. 
Compliance behaviour, contrary to evasion, corresponds to situations where 
taxpayers report their income, consumption and wealthy, accurately and in time, i.e., 
when they fully comply with fiscal obligations to them applied by fiscal law.  
 
1.1 Tax Evasion theories  
The bases of economic theory of tax compliance consist mainly in preventing 
tax evasion through the control of detection levels, tax rates and penalty rates, i.e., 
through the control of deterrence and economic determinants, as it is shown by the 
classic model of tax compliance of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In this model tax 
evasion is a problem of choice under uncertainty, in which the taxpayer, pursuing 
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expected utility maximization, has to choose between a safe asset - tax compliance -, 
and a risky asset - tax evasion. Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) model predicts that 
an increase in probability of detection and penalty rates leads to higher levels of 
reported income. Several works were conducted developing extensions of this 
seminal model. In one of these works, Alm et al. (1992) showed that lower tax fees 
and higher overall income also lead to higher levels of reported income. 
 Despite the great contribution to the development of compliance literature, 
Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) model was object of several critics, since it cannot 
explain the effective levels of evasion. According to its conclusions, taxpayers 
choose the amount of income to report in order to maximize their expected utility, 
however that does not explain why some individuals pay all of their taxes regardless 
the level of enforcement existent. Furthermore, even with low levels of deterrence 
some individuals report the totality of their income, contradicting the Allingham and 
Sandmo’s predictions. If taxpayers behaved as the standard model predicts, with the 
assumption of economic rational behaviour, levels of tax evasion should be much 
higher than what the effective numbers show, since levels of enforcement worldwide 
are not high enough to justify the high levels of compliance. (Coricelli et al., 2003). 
Taxpayers’ decisions about whether to evade or not take place in a complex 
economic environment; so, it is unlikely, that a simple solution of tax police can 
address this issue in an effective manner. Several scholars agree that tax evasion 
cannot be fully explained by financial determinants and economic incentives (see 
e.g., Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Siqueira and Ramos (2005); Alm et al. 1992; Frey and 
Feld, 2002).  So, a different approach has gained ground in the literature, based 
mostly on the study of the behavioural aspects related with compliance decision-
making process (see e.g. Scholz and Pinney, 1995; Alm et al., 1992;; Pommerehne et 
al., 1994; Alm et al., 1999; Frey and Torgler, 2007) 
Some empirical studies have focused on the development of a more complete 
model, grounded, on the basis of the classic model of compliance but also including 
new findings on psychological and social factors, which have been proven to play an 
important role in taxpayers’ decisions (see e.g. Alm et al., 1992; Méder et al., 2012). 
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 Therefore, the main goal of researchers is to identify and explain the 
determinants of tax evasion, including, the ones which go behind the scope of 
economic extension.  
Hence, behavioural aspects that influence the tax compliance decision-
making process have received an increasing attention from researchers in recent 
years (see e.g. Scholz and Pinney, 1995; Alm et al., 1992;; Pommerehne et al., 1994; 
Alm et al., 1999; Frey and Torgler, 2007). However, there is still a lot to explore in 
order to develop a model that can fully explain tax evasion behaviour. This work 
aims to contribute to this development by creating empirical evidence of behavioural 
variables on tax compliance. 
 
1.2 Determinants of tax evasion  
Tax evasion behaviour is a complex phenomenon involving both, economic 
determinants, contextual factors, psychological biases and, motivations such as 
monetary incentives and moral constraints (Alm, Jackson and McKee, 1992). 
For simplicity purposes, we divided the determinants in two different 
categories: the economic determinants, variables related with standard economic 
models of tax compliance; and the non-economic determinants, which include 
contextual specificity of income declaration, individual differences and group-related 
behaviour (Franzoni, 1999).         
              Economic determinants 
As stated before in this work – section 1 - economic determinants are in the 
basis of classic models of tax compliance, and a lot was achieved in this area. Some 
results are consistent between authors and studies. However there are determinants 
which had led to inconclusive results.  
An economic indicator that is instantly associated with tax evasion is the tax 
rate in law. Some studies of empirical analysis show that higher tax rates lead to 
lower levels of compliance, which means that a higher tax burden results in an 
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increase in levels of tax evasion (Clotfelter, 1983; Poterba, 1987; Crane and 
Nourzard, 1987). This is one of the points where the standard model of compliance 
of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) has received some critics, since its predictions are 
not clear about the influence of tax rates in tax evasion
1
.  
Another area that deserved the attention of researchers was the analysis of the 
relation between compliance levels and the level of enforcement actions, which 
compose the most typical weapon of tax authorities against tax evasion. The majority 
of those works produced evidence that higher levels of enforcement can foster tax 
compliance behaviour, since they make tax evasion a riskier option to taxpayers. The 
variables that are often used in enforcement actions are the probability of audit, the 
penalty rates and tax fees (Franzoni, 1999). 
Other result from the study of economic determinants of compliance is the 
existence of a positive relation between the probability of a taxpayer being selected 
for an audit and tax compliance, i.e., a higher probability of audit leads to higher 
levels of reported income and consequently low levels of evasion. Alm et al. (1992), 
showed that even a low probability of audit foster compliance, since some 
individuals are oversensitive and overweight the probability of audit. As seen 
previous in this work, this result is in accordance with the predictions of Allingham 
and Sandmo’s (1972) model of compliance. 
The penalty rates and tax fees applied by tax authorities as a measure of 
enforcement are another important economic determinant of tax evasion behaviour. 
Proving the predictions of Allingham and Sandmo’s model on this matter, empirical 
evidence shows that higher penalty rates lead to higher levels of compliance (e. g. 
Alm et al., 1992; Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). 
Another aspect that raised interest among tax compliance’s researchers was to 
understand how the level of tax evasion varies by income level. Christian (1994) 
                                                          
1
 Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) model proposes that tax rates changes can create two different 
effects: the substitution effect, in which increasing tax rates foster compliance and the income effect in 
which higher tax rates encourages evasion.  
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reported, based on 1988 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP)
2
, that 
lower-income individuals evade more than higher-income individuals, in proportion 
of their effective income.  Alm et al. (1992) also stated that a higher overall income 
leads to higher levels of reported income. However, there are works that demonstrate 
a different relation between these two variables, showing that high-income 
individuals show also the highest levels of unreported income.  
Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) model concluded that taxpayers with higher 
income will increase the percentage of income hidden from tax authorities, since 
their disposition to hold risky assets increases as income increases. In spite of all the 
empirical evidence that sustains the importance of economic enforcement 
determinants to control tax evasion and encourage compliance, a significant part of 
tax compliance behaviour cannot be explained by these determinants, for instance, 
the high levels of tax compliance, unpredicted by the classical economic models of 
tax evasion (Casey and Scholz, 1991).  
 
Non-economic determinants 
As stated before the standard models of tax compliance are not capable of 
explaining the effective levels of tax compliance (Casey and Scholz, 1991; Alm et 
al., 1992). Compliance is in reality much higher than the predictions made by the 
traditional theory of compliance. And this is where the psychological determinants 
take place, as they can help in the explanation of this discrepancy between theory and 
reality. 
There are several studies proving that individual’s tax evasion behaviour is 
affected by social norms and interactions. Erard and Feinstein (1994) stated that 
sentiments of shame and guilt can play an important role in tax compliance 
behaviour, since they can reduce the perception of the benefits of evasion and, by so, 
influence taxpayers’ decisions towards more compliance. The perception of the 
                                                          
2
 Taxpayer  Compliance Measurement Program TCMP of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is one 
of the most reliable sources of tax evasion data, and i tis a program of intensive audits conducted on 
random samples (Andreoni et al., 1998) 
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fairness of the tax burden can also be of significant importance. Spicer and Becker 
(1980) proved that if taxpayers believe that the tax system is unfair, they are more 
likely to evade, in order to restore equity. 
Individuals have an intrinsic motivation to obey the normative status of tax 
compliance (Posner, 2000; Traxler, 2010; Halla, 2010). This concept is known as tax 
morale and can help to explain why tax evasion deterrence based on the economic 
determinants cannot explain effective high levels of compliance.  
Stemming from the substantial difference between individual behavior (actual 
compliance) and an attitude (captured by survey data on tax morale), Halla (2010) 
explored the causal link between tax morale and compliance behavior by analyzing 
the relation between tax morale (measured by specific questions of the European and 
World Values Surveys - WVS) and estimates of Underground Production, assumed 
as form of non-compliance behavior. They found a weak correlation between both. 
However there were studies with different conclusions. Torgler and Schneider (2009) 
found a significate correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow economy 
based on data from more than fifty countries. Their results propose that tax morale 
plays an important role in determining the size of shadow economy, i.e., higher tax 
morale leads to a smaller shadow economy.  
 
      1.3  Operationalization of tax evasion  
Tax evasion is a complex issue and its investigation requires the use of a 
variety of methods and data sources.  
One of the main problems of tax evasion relates to its measuring. First, data 
from individual level of tax evasion are not observable, and second, the most 
accurate source of information on individual compliance is based on direct 
measurement of evasion through actual audits of individual income, however this 
approach as several limitations. Namely, sample limitations since it covers an 
insignificant part of the overall population. Ideally, the best way to measure tax 
evasion would be to directly ask individuals how much of the earned income have 
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they reported. However this is a utopic approach, since an individual evading tax 
payment, will most likely lie about that when asked in a survey or other self-reported 
measure of tax evasion (Alm, 2012).  
Andreoni et al. (1998) summarized the main approaches of measuring tax 
evasion. First the audit data, resulting from the actions of tax authorities; survey data; 
tax amnesty data; measurements of discrepancies found in economic statistics, like 
the tax gap, and finally data generated through laboratory experiments. 
Given all the limitations associated with measuring and collecting accurate 
data on tax evasion, researchers started to develop ways to operationalize tax evasion 
as a global game in a laboratorial setting, where the expected determinants of actual 
behaviour could be manipulated and the actual performance of individuals measured 
(Sanchéz-Villalba, 2010). In these experiments participants engage in tax-reporting 
situations in a controlled environment, where tax parameters and behavioural factors 
are manipulated in order to assess their influence in compliance decision.  
Though limited, this approach provides a global standard and basic model for 
the analysis of evasion (Baldry, 1986). The main limitation of experimental 
approaches is the artificially feature of the laboratory environment that makes 
difficult to transpose the results to the real world (Spicer and Hero, 1985). On the 
other hand, this same characteristic, that is reason of some limitations, is one of the 
advantages of this approach, since it provides more control than other methods. That 
is why researchers have been making use of it to study compliance and tax evasion 
(see e.g. Friedland et al., 1978; Spicer and Becker, 1980).  The approach that we 
propose for this work consists in an experiment in which the participants are placed 
in a position of choosing whether to evade or to comply.  
Therefore the main challenge for research in tax evasion is the definition of 
the set of variables that guide taxpayers’ behaviour, in other words, the definition of 
the determinants of tax evasion. And this is one of the areas where the behavioural 
economic approach has been producing several developments. (Alm et al. 1992; 
Kirchler et al., 2007; Fortin et al. 2007 ) 
14 
  
2. Behavioural economics and decision-making 
The traditional economic theory that tries to explain human behavior is based 
on the assumption of unbounded rationality, outcome oriented decision making, 
selfishness, self-control, and the expected utility maximization (Thaler and 
Mullainathan, 2000; Hashimzade et al., 2013). Yet the evidence shows that 
individuals often make decisions economically suboptimal (see e.g., Kahneman, 
2011) and are influenced by external factors (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Kirchler 
et al., 2007). Therefore the models of heuristic judgment have gained increasing 
importance in recent literature (see e.g. Coricelli et al. 2007; Casey and Scholz, 
1991). These models claim that decision-making is influenced by several relevant 
elements which are ignored by traditional economic models, such as individuals‘ 
perceptions of the social environment and the tax justice (Méder et al., 2012), 
individuals’ cognitive limitations and sentiments (Coricelli et al. 2007) or framing 
related effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) 
Since the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) many studies have 
been carried out in the field of behavioral economics producing evidence of the 
existence of a discrepancy between individuals’ effective decisions and decisions 
provided by the rational choice theory, trying to explain, at the same time, those 
situations in light of individuals’ bounded rationality (see e.g. Coricelli et al. 2007; 
Kirchler et al., 2007 ). The fact that individuals have cognitive limitations leads them 
to often base their decisions in cognitive biases instead on the rational choice theory.  
The model of heuristic judgment developed by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974), from the work of the pioneer Herbert Simon (1955), takes in account these 
cognitive biases. It states that many of the decisions are taken using cognitive 
shortcuts - heuristics - which speed up and simplify the process of problem solving, 
despite not providing an optimal result. It can be said that the demand for the typical 
maximization of standard models is replaced by the search for a satisfactory result. 
Several works have been developed in the study of heuristics, including in its 
formalization, and soon emerged results that put this theory of decision making 
alongside the models of rational cognition (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). 
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Tversky and Kahneman (1974), present different types of heuristics and refer that 
these simplified rules, often lead individuals to commit errors of judgment due to the 
existence of cognitive biases, that involuntarily, cause a deviation in judgment from 
the rational decision making. 
The existence of cognitive short-cuts can be related with the way by which 
individuals process the information in a decision-making process. Accordingly to 
Kahneman’s work, there are two modes of reasoning that are present in the process 
of individual making decisions.  We are going to present now this two modes of 
thinking introduced by Kahneman (2011) and sustained by several other works. 
 
2.1 Dual process thinking: system 1 and system 2 
One of the main themes in Thinking, Fast and Slow, work in which 
Kahneman (2011) gathers his main researches, is the dual process theory, in which 
he distinguishes two systems that operate in the process of making decisions.  
Kahneman characterized System 1 (S1) as operating automatically, taking 
intuitive and often involuntary decisions based on the knowledge “stored in memory 
and accessed without intention and without effort” (Kahneman, 2011). Often this 
system works efficiently; however, due to the use of heuristics, it has some 
systematic biases, particularly when it addresses easier questions than the original 
ones.  
On the other hand, System 2 (S2) operates deliberatively, addressing complex 
situations, taking in account alternative interpretations and gathering information 
until get to the conclusions. S2 can control S1 and avoid some of the biases. Despite 
that, according to Kahneman (2011), S2 requires self-control and effort which is 
unpleasant, making this system lazy and often obeying to the law of least effort, 
failing to intervene when would be beneficial as is the case of S1 biases. 
Kahneman was not the only one presenting the existence of two systems of 
thinking. Several studies analyzed the cognitive processes and proved the 
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coexistence of these two types of reasoning: the ones that are automatic and 
effortless and the ones that are slow, controlled and effortful. They are defined in 
different ways according to the authors: implicit/explicit (Evans, 2003), 
unconscious/conscious or Type 1/Type 2 (Evans, 2008). In this study we are going to 
use Kahneman’s terminology of S1 and S2 to designate the two modes of thinking 
and reasoning. 
The existence of heuristics that are proved to be part of the decision-making 
process, and which are associated with the use of S1, are one of the reasons that 
make the standard economic theories incapable of explaining several situations, and 
can also be an explanation in failures of standard economic theory of compliance 
behavior. 
 Tax evasion decisions are also influenced by the existence of heuristics 
associated with the use of S1, such as the perception of the fairness of the fiscal 
system, the perception of the levels of evasion of others (social norms) or the 
perception of the audit probability. Variables like these influence taxpayers decision 
in an automatic and involuntary way deviating it from the consideration of the 
rational economic benefits and costs of compliance.   
Spicer and Hero (1985) conducted one experiment that analysed the presence 
of some heuristics in tax compliance decision making process. They were able to 
conclude that taxpayers who have been audited perceived the audit probability as 
higher and so, their level of evasion decrease.  
 
2.2 Expected utility theory and Prospect Theory  
One of the failures of standard economic theories that have been studied is its 
reliance on expected utility theory. The theory of expected utility states that the 
decision’ makers based their decisions on the expected utility of each uncertain 
prospect, i.e., they compare the expected utility values of each choice by summing 
the utility of every possible outcome weighted by their respective probabilities 
(Mongin, 1997)  
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 As we referred previous in this work, there are several circumstances in 
which the standard economic theory of rational choice fails and the axioms of 
expected utility theory are not verified (Hashimzade et al., 2013). Loss aversion is one 
of those cases, since it consists in individuals’ preference to avoiding losses rather 
than obtaining gains, even if they have the same expected utility value, which means 
that the expected utility theory is violated. This concept was demonstrated by 
Kahneman et al. (1990) in order to explain the fact that people attribute higher value 
to a good that they own than a similar good that they do not own
3
. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) address this other failures of expected utility theory and developed 
the prospect theory as its substitute. 
The prospect theory, by combining the existence of heuristics and biases with 
the standard optimization approach, is a more complete model which can, thus, 
accomplish better results for the understanding of the effective process of decision 
making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
 
3. Identifiable Victim Effect  
The literature has been showing increasingly evidence of the existence of 
cognitive biases in the decision-making process, which proved already the 
importance of behavioral and psychological aspects on individuals’ decisions 
contemplating for that tax compliance decision. As previously seen in chapter 2 
several recent works have been developed in the field of compliance theory in order 
to determine these cognitive biases and include them in the utility function of the 
models of compliance behavior. 
In this work one of the our aims of study is  one specific cognitive bias that 
recent literature has been developing mostly in the scope of explaining the behavior 
related with donations, which is the Identifiable Victim Effect (IVE). Despite recent 
developments, this theme has not yet been explored deeply enough which justified, 
in part, this work. However the main motivation of our focus in the IVE is our 
                                                          
3
 Endowment Effect (see Kahneman et al., 1990) 
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believe that this effect can play an important role, outside the boundaries of donation 
subject, in the understanding  of taxpayers’ behaviour, by bringing insights to the 
development of some of the failures of the standard economic theory of individual 
decision making. 
Schelling was the first to identify this effect in his work about the worth of 
preventing human death (Schelling, 1968). He noted the distinction between 
individual lives and statistical lives and instilled the first concerns about the 
differences in reactions toward identified and non-identified victims. Since the work 
of Schelling many studies have been conducted regarding the IVE and its 
specificities, mostly of them following Schelling’s scope, that is why in this chapter 
we will be addressing the theme using his terms, “identifiable victim”, 
“unidentifiable victim” and “donor”.  
The IVE could be described as the discrepancy between the bigger efforts 
made by people to save an identified victim than to save unidentified or abstract 
victims (Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997). When a victim (person in need) is identified 
by name, age, picture or any other specific information the empathy triggered on 
donors (person who helps) increases compared to the cases where the target of the 
donations are unidentified victims (also called statistical victims) (Ein-Gar and 
Levontin, 2012). 
The IVE by its definition clearly violates the expected utility theory, since it 
proves that there are situations in which the lifes in the same situations are valued in 
a different way simply for their characteristics of identifibiality, being, accordingly to 
this effect, given higher value to save an identifiable life than  saving an non-
identifiable life in the exactly same situation. This can even go further, as Slovic 
(2007) demonstrates in one of his works:  a single identifiable life can be valued  
higher than 10 lives in the same situation of need but with no identifiability. 
Accordingly to the expected utility theory the value of ten lives is equal to ten times 
the value of one single life. Therefore, the study of IVE could help understand some 
of the situations in which standard assumptions of traditional economic theory are 
disobeyed, which is also the case of the standard theory of tax compliance. 
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The IVE brings with it the importance of the definition of the concept of  
identifiability. There are several different aspects that can be responsible for the 
identification of the victim. The most common are the personal characteristics where 
are included aspects like the name, age, gender, profession, nationality, picture, etc. 
One question that emerged in the study of IVE was the possibility that this specific 
characteristics, used to identified the victim, were the reason for the differences in 
responses from the donors rather than the identifiability of the victim per se. Small 
and Lowenstein (2003) answered this question and proved that even if no 
information about the victims is given, determined victims will still evoke greater 
donations than undetermined victims. The example used in their work was a donation 
to a family in need in which the identifiable hypothesis was helping the “family x” 
and the non-identifiable hypothesis to help one of the families in need. They proved 
that the simple pre determination of the victim - “family x” -, without any other 
information presented is enough to trigger a stronger reaction on the donor, resulting 
in higher donations, than in cases when the victims are not determined previously.     
Despite being a violation of a standard economic theory, several studies 
produced robust evidence of the existence of the identifiable victim effect and 
reached some interesting conclusions. The general conclusions of these studies is that 
information about the victim invokes empathy on donors and, by so, leads to  a 
higher response to saving the victim (see e.g. Ein-Gar and Levontin, 2012; Small and 
Lowenstein, 2003), furthermore it was demonstrated that this effect is stronger when 
the identifiable victim is a single individual (Slovic, 2007). 
After the clear evidence of IVE existence, researchers started to focus on the 
manipulation of different variables in order to better understand and explain this 
effect.  
   One interesting result was achieved by Small et al. (2007), shows that 
teaching people to recognize the effect originates less donations to identifiable 
victims but, unexpectedly, do not increase the donations toward statistical victims, 
so, it appears, in this case, that a more deliberatively (S2) way of thinking results in 
an overall reduction on donations.  
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Small and Loewenstein (2005) showed that the identifiability effect is also 
verified in cases of punitiveness rather than donation. They called it the “equivalent 
effect for punitiveness” and can be defined as the fact that “people are more punitive 
toward identified wrongdoers than toward equivalent, but unidentified, wrongdoers” 
(Small and Loewenstein, 2005).  
Hence, the IVE can be seen as a special case of a more general phenomenon 
pointed for Small and Loewenstein (2005) as the identifiable other effect – the 
tendency to an identifiable target evoke a stronger emotional reaction than a non-
identifiable one.  
Small et al. (2007) analyzed the importance of feelings in the IVE. They 
concluded that if people were induced with feeling-base thinking or with an analytic 
thinking, before the decision took place, the donations will be bigger in the first case 
for the identifiable victim and no difference will be shown on statistical victims. This 
may suggest that the identifiable victim effect occur mainly when decisions are based 
on intuition (S1) rather than deliberative thinking (S2).   
Some other studies have been focusing in possible causes of IVE. Jenni and 
Loewenstein (1997) discussed four possible causes of this effect; vividness - the IVE 
results from the existence of situations that are characterized by being concrete and 
detailed (identifiability) and which are proved to have a greater influence in people’s 
judgments rather than situations with less vivid information; certainty and 
uncertainty - identifiable victims are usually associated with certainty of occurrence 
whereas statistical victims are associated with probabilities; ex-post versus ex-ante 
evaluation – identifiable victims already exist, so the evaluation is made ex-post 
whereas statistical victims evaluation is usually made before the event occur; 
proportion of the reference group that can be saved - an increase in the proportion of 
the reference group saved increases the motivation to help, i. e. identifiable victims 
become their own reference group which means that if the victim is saved, 100% of 
the reference group would be saved. 
In their study, Jenni and Loewenstein (1997) concluded that the most 
significant of the effects they analyzed is the proportion of the reference group saved, 
21 
  
this means that one of the main reasons that make the identifiable victims produce 
greater empathic response than non-identifiable victims is the fact that in the first 
case the proportion of the reference group at risk is higher, i.e. the probability of 
fatality is higher. 
This effect has been subject of several studies proving its existence. In recent 
literature, is also known as the proportion dominance effect (PDE), and can be 
defined as a greater tendency to help victims when they are part of a small group 
(saving 20 of 100) than when their reference group is larger (saving 20 of 500) 
(Finucane, Peters and Slovic, 2002). Individuals choose to save a greater proportion 
even if that means saving fewer lives (Bartels and Burnett, 2011). This means that an 
increase in the proportion of the reference group saved increases the motivation to 
help. This effect implies that the value of a life decreases when the reference group 
increases, this violates the theory of expected utility- is a cognitive bias associated 
with the IVE.  
   Being the IVE evidence of a violation of the expected utility theory, its 
study is of great relevance in order to bring insights to the understanding of some of 
the standard economic theory’s failures and find possible explanations that can 
contribute to develop theories of human decision-making, through the identification 
and understanding of its determinants. The goal is to achieve more accurate and 
complete models of decision making.  
In the specific case here in study, tax evasion, the analyses of IVE and its 
influence in taxpayer’s decisions can be of great interest. The presence of this effect 
in compliance behaviour would suggest that manipulation of information available to 
taxpayers about taxes’ causes, can play an important role in influencing their level of 
compliance, and thus, policy makers must be aware of this information in order to 
find out the better way to use it in favor of compliance.  
Hereupon one of our goals in this study is to analyze if IVE is one 
determinant of taxpayers’ behavior in compliance decision.  
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3.1 Psychological distance 
The identification of the victim required by the IVE is more likely to happen 
when there is some level of proximity between donors and victims. A study 
concluded that the more information donors have about the victims and their 
environment the more they identify themselves with the victims, which, in turn, has 
a positive impact on the willingness to aid (Zagefka et al., 2012). 
  This proximity can be related with different aspects from knowledge or even 
geography or cultural characteristics (Ein-Gar and Levontin, 2012). 
 This phenomenon is associated with a concept addressed in several studies, 
the psychological distance. A target/victim/object is distant if it is perceived as 
different and distant from the state/identity of the decision maker. Psychological 
distant objects are those that can be constructed or reconstructed but they cannot be 
experienced directly (Liberman et al., 2007).  
The relation between psychological distance and IVE has been proved by 
several works. Kogut and Ritov (2007) showed that the IVE is stronger when the 
donors perceived the victims (or the beneficiaries of the donation, in our case the 
taxes’ beneficiaries) as part of their in-group, this is the same thing of saying that the 
IVE gets stronger as smaller the psychological distance between the donors and the 
donation’s target gets.  
Some studies suggest that psychological distance is one of the causes for the 
identifiable victim effect, which means, that the preference to donate to a specific 
person in need, occurs when people feel psychologically close to the donation target 
(Loewenstein & Small, 2007; Small et al., 2007; Ein-Gar. and Levontin, 2012). 
There are different dimensions of psychological distance - time, geographical, 
social distance, and hypothetical - that affect the way individuals process the 
information, and by so, their choices and behaviors. However in this experiment the 
main dimension observed is geographical distance, as the decision’s targets change 
in the region aspect, and by so the distance, i.e., the level of construal varies between 
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treatments, as one gets closer to an object, the information becomes more accurate 
and detailed (Liberman et al., 2007).  
Besides the geographical factor there is an important social factor too, that 
can affect the compliance decision in specific cases, and that is related to the fact that 
individuals perceive the out-groups using more abstract concepts, they do not 
identified themselves with them as much, compared with in-groups. For instance, if 
we are talking about a contribution to a public investment in the south of Portugal the 
population from north of country will not feel as much empathy with the cause of 
contribution as if the investment was made in the north or center of Portugal, this fact 
is due to the existence of a social distance between individuals, related with customs, 
traditions, or accent of a certain place. A person from Lisbon does not identify 
himself so easily with someone from Porto then with someone from Lisbon or Leiria.  
Hereupon the inclusion of psychological distance as one of the variables in 
our study is clearly justified. First, its importance as one of the identified causes of 
IVE and, furthermore, its practical applicability to the tax evasion issue, as the 
population’s perception about taxes’ targets can influence their willingness to 
comply. If a taxpayer perceived that his taxes beneficiates mostly population that is 
social/geographically distant from him, he will have less incentive to comply. 
 
3.3 The role of social norms 
The differences between the observed behaviour of individuals and the one 
predicted by the standard models of economic are well known. As it was stated 
before several explanations from psychological, social and behavioural aspects have 
been suggested for the researchers to justify this discrepancy. 
One of the aspects that often come up in the studies of the behavioural and 
social aspects behind the tax compliance, is the influence of social norms in 
individuals’ decision making process, i. e., in which way the perceptions of the 
individual about how the others will behave and how others will judge his actions, 
will shape his own decision (Alm et al., 1999).  
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Alm et al. (1999) define social norm as “a pattern of behavior that is judged in 
a similar way by others”. As a result, individual behavior is inclined to follow these 
social norms, since, if some behavior is social approved then individuals will behave 
accordingly to it. The same happens if the behavior is social disapproved with 
individual following the pattern.  
The role of the social norms in individuals’ behaviour was studied and 
sustained by the work of several researchers. Gordon (1989) and, Myles and Naylor 
(1996) present the concept of a ‘psychic payoff’, which they refer as being the value 
that the individual takes from adhering to the pattern of behaviour of his or her 
reference group. 
Understanding in which way and how significant is the influence of social 
norms in tax compliance behaviour can play an important role in the development of 
more efficient policies and procedures of compliance. 
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Part II- Experimental Study 
 
1. Purpose and hypotheses of the study  
Regarding the literature review described above the goal of this study is to 
use a controlled experiment of tax evasion to test predictions of behavioral economic 
theory in particular the use of cognitive biases in the decision making process, 
related with psychological aspects and social norms.   
The goal is to achieve results that highlight the importance of considering 
individual’s attitudes and intentions towards tax compliance over and above the 
traditional economic considerations. We do this by testing the influence of three 
variables in tax compliance behavior.  
First, we have the identifiability (IVE), related with the existence of available, 
specific and salient, information, about the tax cause, for taxpayers, which we expect 
to influence positively decision of compliance; in our study this variable is present by 
the different features of the cause (hospital) receiving the tax collection of the game 
that simulates the individual declaration of income. 
 Secondly, the geographical distance, variable that intends to capture the 
influence of geographical distance between taxpayer and tax cause in the decision of 
income declaration.  
Finally we test the influence of the social norms in tax compliance decision, 
i.e. we analyze the influence of distinct social acceptable behaviour - comply or 
evade – on individual behavior.   
 According to the studies mentioned in the present work, our prediction is that 
IVE will influence participants’ decisions of compliance. It is expected that 
participants decide to comply more in the presence of identifiability. Since, like 
proved for several works in the field, the vividness and salience of the information, 
associated with the identifiable treatment, foster a more intuitive way of processsing 
the information (S1), rather than a more deliberative reasoning, which in turn is 
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associated with the rational economic decision (S2) and so, with the assumptions of 
the classical theory of compliance. We predict that the identifiability will trigger 
greater empathy on taxpayers, which we believe, will lead, in our experiment, to a 
better awareness of the importance of the tax revenue collected (Jenni and 
Loewenstein, 1997). Therefore, the willingness to comply when the cause of the tax 
revenue is identifiable – Hospital of São Joao in Porto and Hospital of Santa Maria in 
Lisbon – will be higher than when the object is non- identifiable – any hospital in 
Porto and Lisbon.  
Relatively to the variable of geographical distance our predictions are that the 
smaller the distance between participants and the cause – geographical distance 
between participants’ residence place and the hospital receiving tax revenues - higher 
will be the compliance.  
Based on the literature previous presented, the normative context will 
influence compliance behaviour of participants, by promoting it when the norm is too 
comply (High norm) and diminishing it when the norm known is to evade (Low 
norm). 
Summarizing the foregoing discussion, the main hypotheses to be tested by 
the experiment were the following: 
H1) - participants will, on average, decide to comply more when the object is 
identifiable. 
H2) – participants will, on average, decide to comply more when the object is 
psychological closer to them. 
H3) – the IVE will be more robust when the geographical distance is smaller. 
H4) – participants will, on average, comply more in High norm than in Low norm. 
H5) – the reaction time of participants will be smaller in the presence of identifiable 
causes and when the geographical distance is lower. 
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We present now the method and the experimental design selected to test this 
hypothesis. 
 
2. Methodology – public goods game  
The present work consists in an experimental research design, which involves 
the manipulation of one variable to determine possible changes in another variable. 
The main advantage of this method is the greater degree of control and the ability to 
replicate it. There are several forms to apply this method (see e.g., Hashimzade et al., 
2013), the public goods game is one of those and it is the one used on this study. 
The Public Goods Game (PGG) represents a scenario where the social 
dilemma associated with public services provision is presented in a laboratorial 
setting. In the standard form, the scenario recreates an abstract situation where each 
participant receives a monetary endowment. The decision task consists in deciding 
how much to donate to a public budget, that at each round is doubled by the 
experiment and evenly divided by all the players (Weber et al., 2014). The use of this 
scenario as a representation of the tax evasion problem is justified since, as the PGG, 
the tax system represents a social dilemma in which individual interests are in 
conflict with collective interests.  
From a neoclassical economic perspective, the optimal strategy for 
individuals is not to cooperate, i.e. evade. This results from the fact that this 
perspective is based on the assumption that individuals are rational and make their 
decisions in order to maximize their outcome (Kirchler, 2007). 
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Experimental design  
 
This study uses a between-subject design, since each participant only 
participates once, and for a single treatment (Field and Hole, 2003). Participants are 
allocated randomly to the different treatments
4
.  
There are three independent variables in analysis: identifiability (identifiable 
causes and non-identifiable causes), geographical distance
5
 (metropolitan area of 
Porto and Lisbon) and normative context (social norm to comply and social norm to 
evade). 
The identifiability is manipulated by including identifiable causes of the tax 
collection of the game, which consists in an specific hospital of Porto (Hospital of 
Sao Joao) and Lisbon (Hospital of Santa Maria) and non-identifiable causes, which 
simply referred the city of the cause but no specification of the hospital is available 
(treatments: an hospital in Porto and hospital in Lisbon). 
The geographical distance is included by the fact that hospitals are either 
from Porto or from Lisbon. The experiment was conducting with the objective of 
include the majority of participants from the metropolitan area of Porto
6
, and so the 
inclusion of a treatment in which the taxes’ cause is in Porto, to represent the 
geographical proximity, and a treatment with hospital from Lisbon to represent the 
geographical distance.   
 The normative context was include in the experiment by the simple display 
of the information to the participants during the experiment, and was presented as 
being relative to previous sessions of the game. 
The dependent variables are the percentage of declared income relatively to 
income received and the reaction time of the decision-making. The inclusion of the 
                                                          
4
 Randomization of participants across treatments limits correlated effects and sorting biases (Fortin et 
al., 2007).  
5
 The criterion of inclusion for the geographical area was participants living within 150 km of one of 
the capitals of district (Lisbon and Porto), all those outside were placed in condition Outside 
Geographical Area; all the participants living outsider Portugal were excluded.  
6
 From the total of 286 participants, 197 are from the metropolitan area of Porto. 
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reaction time as a dependent variable in this experiment is made in order to 
understand if it is possible to find a pattern in decision making process of compliance 
and evasion that could allow us to identify the use of the distinct modes of reasoning 
– S1 and S2 - presented by Kahneman (2011), and which are, by definition, distinct 
in terms of time of decision – S1 is faster and automatic and S2 is deliberative and 
slower.     
There are 8 treatments in this experiment resulting from the combination of 
each cause, identifiable from Porto and Lisbon (Hospital São Joao Porto, Hospital 
Santa Maria Lisbon), and non-identifiable from Porto and Lisbon - (Hospital of 
Lisbon, Hospital of Porto), and each social norm - comply and evade. 
Given the need for a significant sample, the study was conducted through an 
online survey using the online survey program Qualtrics. 
The experiment consists in a game that pretends to simulate the decision-
making process of individual income declaration.  
The experiment started with the display of the instructions of the game to the 
participants in which were also referred the information about the tax rate
7
, applied 
to the reported income, the penalty fee
8
, in case of detection of unreported income 
and the existence of some probability of being audited. It was also presented in 
instructions the cause of the tax revenue collected in the game, being this one of our 
independent variables varies between treatments,  from  a specific hospital in Porto 
or Lisbon (identifiable treatment) to any hospital from Porto or Lisbon (non-
identifiable treatment). The experiment then was followed by a session of the game, 
composed by 10 rounds. Before the first round starts information about the social 
norm
9
 is presented - social norm to comply (high norm) or social norm to evade (low 
norm) – this information is fixed through all the 10 rounds of the game for each 
participant. In each round the participants receive a variable amount of credits
10
 
which constitutes their income. Then, each participant is requested to decide how 
                                                          
7
The tax rate is fixed during the all game in 25%. 
8
 Penalty fee is a fixed amount of 600 credits. 
9
 The variable of the social norm is presented as low (5% report the total of income) or high (95% 
report the total of income.  
10
 Income varies from a range of 100 to 950 credits. 
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much credits to report. Taxes are paid on reported income, and not on unreported 
income. Between each round a reminder of the initial information appears in the 
screen with the cause of tax collection and the normative context of previous rounds.  
Concluded the 10
th
 round participants had to complete some questions with 
demographical information, as age, gender, education level, country and area of 
residence. 
 
Participants 
The online survey posits several concerns regarding the reliability of the 
collected data. In order to eliminate non-collaborative behaviour from the 
participants we exclude participants that failed to complete all the survey. We also 
exclude participants that failed to meet the criteria for geographical inclusion in the 
experimental conditions (e.g. overseas participants).  With the adjustments done 
there were 286 adult volunteer participants in this experiment with ages between 18-
32 years. 
The participants of the experiment were constituted by 157 women and 129 
men. 
In terms of area of residence the participants were distributed as: 197 from the 
metropolitan area of Porto, 9 from metropolitan area of Lisbon and 80 are included in 
the condition of outside geographical area, since they reside from a distance higher 
than 150k from Porto or Lisbon. 
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3. Results 
The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) program was used to assist 
in the statistical treatment of the data collected. 
Sample size, means and standard deviations for age, mean percentage of 
income declaration and mean reaction times for each experimental group are 
displayed in Table  
 
 Table 1. Samples size, means and standard deviations for age, mean percentage of declared 
income, and mean reaction times for each level of the manipulated independent variables. 
Legend: Dist - Distance; SD – Standard Deviation.   
  
N 
Age Mean % Declared 
Inc. 
Mean Reaction 
Times 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Identifiable 146 25.08 7.43 82.03 24.27 4.05 4.87 
Non-
Identif. 
140 23.67 6.13 81.12 22.19 3.71 3.40 
Low Dist. 141 25.09 7.96 82.34 21.93 3.93 4.96 
High Dist. 145 23.72 5.51 80.85 24.49 3.84 3.36 
High Norm 144 24.03 6.40 82.80 23.38 3.63 3.94 
Low Norm 142 24.75 7.28 80.35 23.10 4.13 4.48 
 
3.1. Main effects of identifiability, geographical distance and normative context  
To test our hypothesis we started realizing three independent samples t tests 
comparing each level of the three independent variables, for both, mean percentage 
of declared income (10 rounds) and mean reaction times.  
In respect to Hypothesis 1 (H1), the identifiability manipulation, for mean 
percentage of declared income, no significant difference was found between 
identifiable causes (M=82.03; SD=24.27) and non-identifiability causes (M=81.12; 
SD=22.19) [t(284)=0.33; p=.742], which means that the hypothesis was not 
confirmed by the results. For the geographical distance manipulation, no significant 
difference was found between low geographical distance (M=82.34; SD=21.93) and 
high geographical distance (M=80.85; SD=24.49) [t(284)=0.54; p=.59], therefore H2 
was not confirmed. Also, for the normative context no significant difference was 
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found between high normative status (M=82.80; SD=23.38) and low normative 
status (M=80.35; SD=23.10) [t(284)=0.89, p=.37], this results do not confirm our 
hypothesis H4. 
 Regarding mean reaction times, H5 was also not confirmed by the 
experiment results, since no significant difference was found between identifiable 
causes (M=4.05; SD=4.87) and non-identifiable causes (M=3.71; SD=3.40) 
[t(284)=0.68; p=.50], low geographical distance (M=3.93; SD=4.96) and high 
geographical distance (M=3.84; SD=3.36) [t(284)=0.18; p=.86], and between high 
normative context (M=3.63; SD=3.94) and low normative context (M=4.13; 
SD=4.48) [t(284)=-0.99; p=.32].  
 
3.2. Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
We conducted a MANOVA with mean percentage of declared income and 
mean reaction times as dependent variables and identifiability, geographical distance 
and normative context as between-subjects factors. For mean percentage of declared 
income, results show no significant second order interactions between identifiability 
and geographical distance (F(1,277)=0.04; p=.84), not confirming our hypothesis H3, 
between identifiability and normative context (F(1,277)=0.04; p=.84) and between 
geographical distance and normative context (F(1,277)=0.38; p=.54). Also, no 
significant third order interaction (identifiability * geographical distance * normative 
context) was found (F(1,277)=2.65; p=.11).  For mean reaction times, results also 
show no significant second order interactions between identifiability and 
geographical distance (F(1,277)=0.88; p=.35), between identifiability and normative 
context (F(1,277)=0.01; p=.93) and between geographical distance and normative 
context (F(1,277)=1.91; p=.17). Also, no significant third order interaction 
(identifiability * geographical distance * normative context) was found 
(F(1,277)=0.25; p=.62). 
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3.3. Main effect of income size   
 In order to test the effects of income size (amount of credits allocated) 
we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with round as within-subjects factor 
with 10 levels (10 rounds with different amounts of credits allocated). We found a 
significant effect of round (F(7.57, 2157.52)=2.57; 2p=.01; =.84; p=.01). Contrast 
analysis showed a significant linear contrast (F(1,285)=15.68; 2p=.05; p<.001) with 
a tendency to higher amounts of allocated credits to elicit lower percentages of 
compliance. Means and Standard Deviations for percentage of declaration for each 
allocated amounts of credits are displayed in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of percentage of declaration for each allocated 
amounts (independent rounds). 
Amount of allocated credits Mean Standard Deviation 
100 84.57 30.32 
300 83.86 30.95 
400 82.90 29.23 
550 81.50 30.91 
600 81.01 31.03 
650 78.96 33.85 
700 82.08 30.67 
750 81.12 30.94 
800 78.66 32.08 
950 78.25 34.36 
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Conclusions  
 
The main goal of this dissertation was to develop an experiment that allowed 
the analyses of how the identifiability of taxes’ causes would influence the tax 
compliance behaviour, in other words, we aimed at understand if the presentation of 
a more specific, vivid and salient information about the finality of tax collection to 
the taxpayers, would influence their decision. Our hypothesis, based on the existent 
literature, was that the presence of the identifiability would enhance compliance 
behaviour, which means that the IVE would be an effect also present in tax evasion 
decision-making process.  
We also intended, with this experiment, to understand the role of the 
psychological distance between taxpayers and the object of tax revenues, measured 
by the geographical distance, and also the influence of the normative social context 
of compliance in taxpayers’ decisions.  
This experiment was realized with Portuguese participants and residents in 
Portugal for, at least, the last 5 years, so the results are applied to Portuguese context 
of tax compliance 
The analysis of reaction’s time  (RT) of participants’ decisions intended to 
identify if there were some degree of variance that would show the existence of the 
use of different ways of processing the decision between the different treatments, 
being able to identify the presence of System 1 (intuitive and faster decisions) and 
System 2 (deliberative and slower decisions). No significant result was achieved, we 
believe that this might result from the features of the experiment. We suggest in 
future works the manipulation of S1 and S2 through its induction on the experiment, 
in order to better evaluate the influence of the two modes of thinking in the decision 
of taxpayers.  
The results of our experiment did not allow us to get answers to our 
questions, since the results were not statistical significant to confirm our hypothesis. 
A possible explanation for these results can be the specificities of the experiment 
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conducted. For instance: the complexity of the instructions, the lack of control that an 
online survey implies, in what concerns to the environment in which the participants 
complete the survey, and also the difficulty to avoid survey fraud, i.e., the difficulty 
of ensure that participants complete the survey honestly and with intention of 
contributing to the advancements of the study.  
Our results allowed us to get some interesting conclusions that came to prove 
some previous studies’ results and theories. The levels of compliance were, on 
average, high – the total average percentage of reported income was around 81% 11- 
although the levels of deterrence in the game did not justify those numbers. This 
result supports the fact already pointed by several researchers which is that the 
effective levels of compliance are much higher than what standard economic theory 
of compliance predicts, based on the assumptions of expected utility maximization, 
rational choice and economic determinants (e. g. tax rate, penalty fee and audit 
probability). Alm et al. (1991) pointed this matter and said that the levels of 
deterrence, which are low in most of the countries, cannot, alone, explain the levels 
of evasion.      
Another relevant result from our experiment was the significant relation 
between income level and compliance behaviour, suggesting that tax compliance will 
decrease as income is increased. This result is in accordance with the predictions of 
the classical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), that concluded that taxpayers 
will increase the percentage of income hidden from the tax authorities since their 
disposition to hold risky assets increases as income increases. 
Therefore we believe that our experiment contributes to literature in the 
empirical ground of tax compliance, by providing an experiment that can propel 
further researchers into work in this problematic taking for base this work and, by 
refining it, try to achieve the conclusive results we were seeking.  
The main limitations of this work can be the first clue for future works as in 
avoid these same limitations. First, the experimental methodology, although being a 
very useful way of operationalizing tax compliance, has some disadvantages: 
                                                          
11
 See Table 1. 
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difficulties in isolating the independent variable, and ensure that no other variable 
influences the results; the fact that is composed by a laboratory setting might make 
difficult to generalize the results to tax evasion in the real world (Spicer and Hero, 
1985), the lack of  control of the participants’ attitudes, since, by knowing that they 
are being tested, they may adopt behaviours they believe to be desired and 
acceptable, which introduces biases in the results (Monteiro, 2005). The online 
survey is also a limitation since creates a bias in the sample collected, due to the fact 
that it is just able to reach to some part of the population, excluding, for instance,  
respondents who do not have access to the internet, and, by so, to this survey. 
We suggest then, that future researches try to implement this experiment in a 
laboratory setting, with a bigger sample and with participants more representative 
from the taxpayers’ population, and also the inclusion of effective measures of 
deterrence, by tax penalty or fee, and audit probability.  
It would also be interesting conduct a similar study but filtering participants, 
and allowing only individuals that already filed declaration of income. 
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